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Casenote

Grutter v. Bollinger: Race as a Factor in
Public Higher Education Admissions
Policies

In Grutter v. Bollinger,' the United States Supreme Court held that
the University of Michigan Law School's goal of student body diversity
was a compelling interest.2 The Court concluded that the Law School's
narrowly tailored race-based admissions program was not prohibited by
the Equal Protection Clause because it furthered "a compelling interest
in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body."3 This decision was unexpected in light of affirmative action
rulings which have limited the use of race in admission programs.4
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, applied to the University
of Michigan Law School ("the Law School") in 1996 with a 3.8 grade
point average and a 161 LSAT score. The Law School initially found

1.
2.
3.
4.
Univ.

123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
Id. at 2339.
Id. at 2347.
See Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the
Sys. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Grutter admissible, then placed her on a waiting list, and subsequently
rejected her application. Gratter filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Law School, the
Regents of the University of Michigan, Lee Bollinger (Dean of the Law
School from 1987 to 1994 and President of the University of Michigan
from 1996 to 2002), Jeffrey Lehman (Dean of the Law School), and
Dennis Shields (Director of Admissions at the Law School from 1991
until 1998). Grutter claimed that the Law School violated the Fourteenth Amendment 5 by discriminating against her on the basis of race.6
Grutter alleged that the Law School "had no compelling interest to
justify its use of race in the admission process."7
The district court conducted a bench trial on the degree to which race
was a factor in the Law School's admissions decisions and whether the
Law School's consideration of race in admissions decisions constituted a
race-based double standard. The court concluded that the Law School's
race-based admissions program was unconstitutional.8 The district
court applied strict scrutiny as the reviewing standard.9 The court
found that the Law School's goal of assembling a diverse student body
was not a compelling interest because Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke' did not recognize it as such.1' The district court
determined that even if student body diversity was a compelling interest,
the Law School's use of race in its admissions program was not narrowly
tailored. 2 The Law School's use of race was not clearly defined, and
no termination point was established. 3 The Law School also failed to
find an alternative solution to increasing minority enrollment. 4 The
district court granted the petitioner's request for declaratory relief and

5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332-33; Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 823-24
(E.D. Mich. 2001).
7. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2333.
8. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 823-25, 871.
9. Id. at 843 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("all
racial classifications... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny")).
10. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11. Grutter,137 F. Supp. 2d at 844. The district court determined the Court in Bakke
did not hold student body diversity was a compelling governmental interest. Id.
12. Id. at 850.
13. Id. at 851 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)
(determining that racial classifications are temporary measures to reach the goal of

equality)).
14. Id. at 852 (citing J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 507 (ruling that the city's failure to
adopt race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in city contracting
was not narrow tailoring)).
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enjoined the Law School from using race as a factor in its admissions
decisions.' 5
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the district court's
judgment and vacated the injunction. 6 The court concluded that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which ruled that student body
diversity was a compelling state interest, was binding authority. 7 The
court determined Justice Powell's opinion was Bakke's holding because
it authorized the most restricted use of race, and it was the narrowest
rationale from Bakke."s The court of appeals ruled that the Law
School's use of race as a "plus factor" was similar to the Harvard College
plan approved by Justice Powell because the admissions program did not
use a quota, there was no separate admissions program for minority
applicants, and factors other than race were considered to contribute to
academic diversity.' 9 The court held that the Law School's use of race
was narrowly tailored because it was modeled after the Harvard plan.2"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the courts of appeals
disagreed on this question of national significance. 2'
The Court
endorsed Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke that "student body diversity
is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in
university admissions."22 The Court adopted strict scrutiny to decide
the case because it was the applicable reviewing standard for all racial
classifications.2" In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the court of
appeals decision and determined that the Law School's goal of attaining
a diverse student body was a compelling interest.2 4 The Court held

15. Id. at 872.
16. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002).
17. Id. at 739. Justice Powell wrote his own opinion which was joined in part by two
groups of concurring Justices, but for different reasons. Justice Powell's opinion was joined
in part by Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger on his ruling that
the Medical School's program was unconstitutional; however, the concurring Justices used
a Title VI analysis rather than Powell's strict scrutiny analysis to reach their conclusion.
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred with Justice Powell in
determining that race can be used in the admissions process for student body diversity.
Unlike Powell, the Justices determined that the Medical School's admissions program was
constitutional under an intermediate scrutiny analysis. Id. at 325-26, 411.
18. Id. at 741 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (concluding that
"when a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds'")).
19. Id. at 746-47.
20. Id. at 746.
21. Grutter,123 S. Ct. at 2335.

22. Id. at 2337.
23. Id. at 2337-38 (quoting Adarand Constructors,515 U.S. at 217).
24. Id. at 2339.
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that the Law School's race-based admissions program did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it was narrowly tailored, and the
educational benefits from a diverse student body were a compelling
interest.2 5
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment26
provides that "no state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."27 Generally, the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons, not groups.2" Justice Powell in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke 29 determined that "[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both
are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal." 0
The Court has struggled with this proposition as applied to affirmative
action programs. Affirmative action is defined as actions which seek to
eliminate current discrimination, remedy the effects of prior discrimina31
tion, and programs which help prevent future discrimination.
Affirmative action programs have been used to remedy the effects of
prior discrimination in employment practices, contract procurement, and
higher education. 2
However, affirmative action in public higher
education, specifically the use of race as a factor in the admissions
process, has been most controversial.
A.

The Development of Race as a Factorin Admissions Programs
33
In DeFunis v. Odegaard,
DeFunis, a white male, was denied
admission to the University of Washington Law School ("Law School")

25. Id. at 2347.
26.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV

§ 2.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
30. Id. at 289-90.
31.

BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 60 (7th ed. 1999).

32. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that Congress could
mandate state and local government compliance with a minority set-aside program under
its commerce power); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that
a state or local subdivision has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that a state has a substantial interest that legitimately may be
served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration
of race and ethnic origin).
33. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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in 1971. The Supreme Court held that the case was moot because
DeFunis was later admitted to the Law School under its revised
admissions program, and he was in his final year of law school when the
case was reviewed.3' Despite this holding, Justice Douglas in his
dissent stated the case should have been determined on its merits
because the use of race in university admissions was a significant
issue."
The Law School's admissions process used an index called the
Predicted First Year Average ("Average"), a formula combining an
applicant's Law School Admission Test ("LSAT") score and his grades in
the last two years of college. 36 The admissions committee attached less
weight to the Average in reviewing minority applicants.3 7 Further,
minority applicants were assigned to a separate admissions committee
from the general applicants. 8 Minority applicants were only compared
competitively with other minority applicants; they were never compared
with non-minority applicants. 9 Thirty-six out of thirty-seven admitted
minority applicants had an Average lower than DeFunis.4 ° The Law
School's counsel admitted that if the enrolled minority applicants were
considered in the same pool as non-minority applicants, they would
never have been admitted.4 1
Justice Douglas determined that the admissions policy limited the
number of seats DeFunis could compete for based solely on his race.42
He concluded the Law School should be subject to strict scrutiny because
it used racial classifications in its admissions process.
Justice
Douglas further stated that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to "eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.""
He opined that reviewing each application

34. Id. at 314-19.
35. Id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 321 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 323 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Law School had two groups of admissions
applicants: One general group and one minority admissions group. The Law School's
application contained an optional question where an applicant could indicate their
"dominant" ethnic origin. The answer to this question was the sole basis for placement in
the minority admissions group. Id. at 320-21.
39. Id. at 323 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 325 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10
(1966)).
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without regard to an applicant's race would keep the admissions process
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.45
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,46 the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis ("Medical School") had a
special admissions program consisting of a separate admissions system
for minority and disadvantaged applicants. 47 The special admissions
program had a separate committee, whose members were mostly from
minority groups. The Medical School's entering class had seats for one
hundred students. Sixteen seats were reserved for minority applicants.
Allan Bakke, a white male who applied twice to the Medical School, was
considered under the general admissions program. Bakke filed suit in
the Superior Court of California after his second rejection, alleging that
the Medical School's special admissions program violated the Equal
Protection Clause." The trial court ruled that "the special program
operated as a racial quota because minority applicants . . . were rated
only against one another."49 The court did not order the Medical School
to admit Bakke. ° Bakke appealed to the Supreme Court of California,
which applied strict scrutiny.5 The state supreme court held that the
special admissions program was not the least intrusive means for the
Medical School to achieve its goals of integrating the medical profession
and increasing the number of physicians serving minority groups.52
The court ordered Bakke to be admitted to the Medical School; however,
the order was stayed because the Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of the important constitutional issue. 3
Justice Powell concluded that a "[s]tate has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program
involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. " "

45. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
47. Id. at 272-74. The Medical School opened in 1968. Its first year class had fifty
students. In 1971 the first year class increased to one hundred students. The faculty
created the special admissions program to increase the number of disadvantaged students
in each class. In 1973 the special admissions program was open to applicants who
indicated on the application form they wished to be considered as "economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged." In 1974 the question was whether the applicant wanted to
be considered as an applicant from a minority group. The minority groups included blacks,
Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians. Id.
48. Id. at 272-79.
49. Id. at 278.
50. Id. at 279.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 281.
54. Id. at 320.
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Justice Powell used strict scrutiny because the special admissions
program classified applicants based on their race and ethnic background,
which was a suspect classification. 55 He reasoned that race alone, in
conjunction with a quota assigned to the admissions process, was not a
necessary means to achieving diversity.5 6 Justice Powell argued that
restricting the focus to ethnic diversity would hinder the attainment of
5 7
However, he supported a diversity admissions
complete diversity.
program like Harvard College's, where race "[did] not insulate the
individual from comparison with other candidates for the available
seats.""
In Harvard's program, race and ethnic background were
positive attributes in an applicant's file, but all other diversity elements
were considered. 9 This placed all applicants on "the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight."6 °
Justice Powell determined that the Medical School's
admissions program violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause because it only focused on ethnic diversity.6 1
Universities must consider factors other than race in attaining student
body diversity.62
Four justices, led by Justice Brennan, determined that the Medical
School's admissions program was constitutional and that race can be
used in university admissions.6 3 Justice Brennan opined that "racial
classifications designed to further remedial purposes 'must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."'' " Using this intermediate scrutiny
level, he concluded that
[the Medical School's] articulated purpose of remedying the effects of
past societal discrimination is ...sufficiently important to justify the
use of race-conscious admissions programs where there is a sound basis
for concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and

55. Id. at 305.
56. Id. at 315.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 317.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 326. Justice Powell determined that Bakke was entitled to an injunction,
which required the Medical School to admit him. Id. at 321.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 325-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The justices
reversed the order requiring the Medical School to admit Bakke. Id. at 379.
64. Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
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chronic, and that handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of
minorities to the Medical School. 5
Justice Brennan reasoned that prior cases established that state
governments can use race-based programs to repair the current effects
of prior discrimination. 6
He determined that the Medical School's
admissions program was valid under this test because of the underrepresentation of minority doctors in the country, and the history of
intentional discrimination against minorities in education.67 Further,
Justice Brennan saw no difference between the Harvard College program
"plus factor" and Davis's set aside program because they both achieved
the same
purpose, but the Harvard program was less obvious to the
68
public.
Four justices, led by Justice Stevens, determined that the Medical
School's admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act69
because it excluded Bakke based on his race.70
Title VI provides
protection for individuals excluded from federally funded programs on
account of their race or ethnicity.71
The dissenters avoided the
constitutional issue because they determined that the case should be
decided on a statutory basis.7 2 Justice Stevens reasoned that the
Medical School violated Title VI when it denied Bakke admission
because it was receiving federal funding.73

65. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See Green v. County
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that a public body engaged in racial discrimination
cannot bring itself into Equal Protection Clause compliance simply by ending its unlawful
acts and adopting a race-neutral stance); Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that racially neutral remedies for past discrimination were
inadequate where consequences of past discriminatory acts influence or control present
decisions); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 42 U.S. 747 (1976) (concluding that Congress
has required or authorized race-conscious action to put individuals impacted by past
discrimination in a position they might have otherwise enjoyed).
67. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 369-70 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 to -7 (2003).
70. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412 (Stevens J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The
justices affirmed the lower courts judgment to order the Medical School to admit Bakke.
Id. at 421.
71. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 to -7.
72. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens opined that the constitutionality of the Medical School's program under the
Fourteenth Amendment should only be decided if the Medical School's programs survived
the Title VI analysis.
73. Id. at 418 (Stevens J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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B. Modern Affirmative Action Cases Interpreting Justice Powell's
Opinion in Bakke
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. University of
Washington Law School74 adopted Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
that university race-based admissions programs serve a compelling
interest when the goal is educational diversity.75 In this case, plaintiffs, white applicants to the University of Washington Law School ("Law
School"), were denied admission and brought suit alleging that their
denials were due to racially discriminatory admissions policies. The Law
School used race as a criteria in its admissions program from 1994 to
1998, and plaintiffs were denied admission during this time period.76
Smith appealed from district court orders dated February 10, 1999 and
February 12, 1999, which denied her motion for partial summary
judgment. 7
The district court denied Smith's motion for partial summary
judgment because it determined that "under Supreme Court precedent
race could be used as a factor in educational admissions decisions, even
where [it] was not done for remedial purposes."7" The court of appeals
concluded the district court correctly followed Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke in applying the following principles: (1) strict scrutiny applies to
race-based classifications; (2) numerical goals based on race are invalid;
(3) eliminating the effects of prior discrimination is a legitimate and
substantial interest; and (4) attaining a goal of student body diversity in
public higher education is constitutionally valid.7 9 The court of appeals
with other factors could
determined ethnic diversity used in conjunction
80
be used to attain student body diversity.
In deciding which Bakke opinion to adopt, the court of appeals
followed the rationale that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest

74. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
75. Id. at 1201.
76. Id. at 1191-92. On November 3, 1998, the State of Washington passed Initiative
Measure 200, Wash. Rev. Code. § 49.60.400(1) (1998), which prohibited the state from
discriminating on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in public
employment, public education, and public contracting. Pursuant to the directive, the Law
School removed the use of race from its admissions program. Id. at 1192.
77. Id. at 1192.
78. Id. at 1196.
79. Id. at 1197.
80. Id.
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grounds.'"'
The court of appeals determined that "Justice Powell's
analysis is the narrowest footing upon which a race-conscious decision
making process could stand." 2 The court then concurred with the
district court, which decided Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was the
current law." The court of appeals concluded that properly designed
race-based admissions programs did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopwood v. Texas85 (Hopwood
III) limited the reach of Justice Powell's ruling in Bakke."6 In the prior
case, Hopwood v. Texas, 7 (Hopwood II) the panel held that
[the Law School] may not use race as a factor in deciding which
applicants to admit (1) in order to achieve a diverse student body, (2)
to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law
school, (3) to alleviate the law school's poor reputation in the minority
community, or (4) to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school.8"
The panel remanded the case, instructing the law school to use a
reasonable race-blind system. 9 Hopwood III is an appeal from the case
which was remanded in Hopwood I1. s°
The University of Texas School of Law ("Law School") gave racial
preferences in its admissions program to increase the enrollment of
certain minorities. 9 ' Cheryl Hopwood applied for admission to the Law
School in 1992. The Law School used the Texas Index ("TI") score,
which is determined independently by the Law School Data Assembly
Service ("LSDAS"). It included an applicant's undergraduate grade point
average ("GPA") and their Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT") score.
The Law School had three categories for the applicants based on their
TI score: (1) presumptive admit, (2) discretionary zone, and (3) presump-

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1199 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000) (Hopwood III).
Id. at 275-76.
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (Hopwood II).
Hopwood III, 236 F.3d at 273 (citing Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 962).
Id. at 261.
Hopwood H, 78 F.3d at 935.
Id. at 934.
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tive denial.92 The TI ranges used for the three categories were lower
for minority applicants than non-minority applicants.9 3
Hopwood's TI score placed her in the presumptive admit category;
however, she was downgraded to the discretionary zone because the
noncompetitive nature of her community college and because her undergraduate university inflated her GPA. She was placed on a waiting list
after a review by the admissions committee. Hopwood was ultimately
denied admission. Professor Wellborn, the Law School's expert witness,
testified Hopwood likely would not have been admitted in a race-blind
program because there were stronger candidates available.9 4 The court
of appeals concluded that the district court correctly found that Hopwood
would not have had a reasonable chance of admission to the Law School
under a color-blind admissions system.95
On appeal in Hopwood III, Texas asserted that the Hopwood II panel's
justifications were clearly erroneous because the Law School had a
compelling interest in remedying the present effects of past discrimination, and it had a compelling interest in obtaining a diverse student
body.96 The court in Hopwood III determined that the Supreme Court
has established that "the government can, consistent with the Constitution, use racial preferences under particular circumstances to remedy the
present effects of past discrimination."97 However, it ruled that the
limits the Hopwood II panel placed on the Law School were valid
because there was no controlling rationale in Bakke defining the
circumstances when a government could use racial preferences.9"
92. Id. at 935-36. Professor Stanley Johanson, chair of the admissions committee in
1992, had the sole responsibility for setting the criteria for the three admissions categories.
Most applicants in the presumptive admit category were admitted to the law school with
Professor Johanson reviewed all
minimal review by the admissions committee.
presumptive admit applications, and he had the discretion to lower them to the
discretionary zone for further review if he found anything questionable. Applicants in the
presumptive denial category also received minimal review; however, the admissions
committee had discretion to upgrade the applicant if they believed his TI score did not
reflect the applicant's potential in law school. Most presumptive denial applicants were
rejected. Applicants in the discretionary zone were subject to the most scrutiny by the
admissions committee. There was a separate process for minority and non-minority
applicants in the discretionary zone. Their applications were processed by a three-person
minority subcommittee which gave each candidate extensive evaluation and discussion.
Id. at 935-37.
93. Id. at 936. The minority applicants included those who designated themselves as
Mexican-Americans or African-American blacks on the application form.
94. Hopwood III, 236 F.3d at 266-72.
95. Id. at 272.
96. Id. at 272-74.
97. Id. at 273.
98. Id. at 275.
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Therefore, the Hopwood II panel had the freedom to decide which Bakke
rationale to follow." The Hopwood II panel concluded that race-based
programs, which sought to attain student body diversity, were unconstitutional."° Although this went against Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke, the court in Hopwood III decided it could not say "that [the
decision] conflict[ed] with any portion of Bakke that [was] binding on
this court."' 0'
Justice Powell's Bakke ruling was further limited by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University
of Georgia. 2 The University of Georgia ("UGA") had a freshman
admissions policy which assigned a fixed numerical bonus to non-white
applicants and male applicants. Applicants admitted in the initial stage
were selected solely on objective academic criteria. The remaining
applicants were evaluated using the Total Student Index ("TSI"), which
was based on a weighted combination of academic, extracurricular,
demographic, including race and gender, and other factors. Applicants
whose TSI scores were a certain threshold were automatically admitted.
Three white females, who were denied admission at the TSI stage under
the race-based policy, brought suit."°
The district court held that UGA's freshman admissions policy was
unconstitutional because "student body diversity [was] not a compelling
interest sufficient to withstand the strict scrutiny that courts must apply
to government decision making based on race.""° The court determined Bakke was not binding precedent; therefore, student body
diversity was not a compelling interest. 10 5 The district court granted

99.

Id.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 1239-42. At the TSI stage, academic factors accounted for 5.40 points
(approximately 67 percent of the maximum points available). Leadership/activity or other

factors accounted for 1.5 points (18 percent of the available total). Three demographic
factors were considered for up to 1.25 additional points (15 percent of the maximum
available). These included race/ethnicity (non-Caucasian), gender (male), and Georgia
residency. Overall, only one other TSI factor, SAT score or ACT equivalent between 12001660, was worth more than the race factor. Id.
104. Id. at 1237.
105. Id. at 1239. UGA wanted the court to use Justice Powell's opinion as the majority
decision in Bakke. UGA asserted its program was similar to the Harvard program
endorsed by Justice Powell and was constitutional. The district court determined Powell's
discussion on the Harvard program was dicta and was not endorsed by any other justices.
Therefore, it was not binding precedent to the court. The district court used the analysis
in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena that: (1) racial classifications used for non-remedial
purposes are suspect, (2) race-conscious programs must meet a compelling interest, and (3)
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summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor because UGA's admissions policy
VI and the Equal Protection Clause.' 6 UGA appealed
violated Title
107
decision.
the
The court of appeals applied strict scrutiny in deciding the case
because "[classifications] of citizens solely on the basis of race 'are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.'"'" 8 The court determined that Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke was persuasive; however, it was not binding
precedent because a Supreme Court majority had never held that
student body diversity was a compelling interest that justified the use
The holding from Bakke that the
of race in admissions programs.'
court followed was that student body diversity was an important
interest, but the interest was not a compelling one that would withstand
strict scrutiny."0 The court of appeals reasoned that "the status of
student body diversity as a compelling interest justifying a racial
preference in university admission is an open question in the Supreme
Court ... ."" The court of appeals then developed its own test for
determining whether a school's admissions program served a compelling
interest:
(1) whether the policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way that does
not take sufficient account of the different contributions to diversity
that individual candidates may offer; (2) whether the policy fully and
fairly takes account of race-neutral factors which may contribute to a
diverse student body; (3) whether the policy gives an arbitrary or
disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and
(4) whether the school has genuinely considered and rejected as
inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating student body
diversity112
The court of appeals held that UGA's freshman admissions policy was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored."' UGA did not
consider other ways to achieve student body diversity, and its use of race

a majority of the Supreme Court had not determined that student body diversity in higher
education is a compelling interest. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Johnson v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1368-69, 1371 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
106. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1242.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1243 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (Shaw 1) (quoting
Hirabayahsi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
109. Id. at 1248.
110. Id. at 1247.
111. Id. at 1250.
112. Id. at 1253.
113. Id. at 1254.
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and disproportionately
was inflexible
4
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advantaged certain

racial

groups."

COURT'S RATIONALE

III.
5

In Grutter v. Bollinger," the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the courts of appeals concerning whether race
can be a factor in university admissions."' The Court adopted strict
scrutiny as the reviewing standard because "all governmental action
based on race-a group classification long recognized as 'in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited'-should be subjected
to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal
protection of the laws has not been infringed."" 7 The Court interpreted
this to mean that only narrowly tailored race-based classifications, which
furthered compelling governmental interests, were constitutional." 8
The Court further determined that not all governmental uses of race
were invalidated by strict scrutiny.1 9 The Court reasoned that the
purpose of strict scrutiny was to ensure governmental uses of race were
pursuing important goals. 2 °
The Law School "assert[ed] only one justification for their use of race
in the admissions process: obtaining 'the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body.' " 121 The Court deferred to the Law School's
educational judgment in holding that its goal of student body diversity
was a compelling interest.'2 2 The Court reasoned that courts have
traditionally given a degree of deference to universities to make their
own decisions regarding admissions policies. 23 The Court presumed
that the Law School's goal of attaining a diverse student body was done
faith and that it was the Law School's proper institutional
in good 124
mission.

The Law School enrolled a "critical mass" of minority students to
achieve its goal of assembling a diverse and academically qualified
class. 25 It defined a "critical mass" as "meaningful numbers" or

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1255.
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
Id. at 2335.
Id. at 2337 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-38.
Id. at 2338.
Id.
Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. Grutter (No. 02-241)).
Id. at 2339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"meaningful representation." ' This meant "a number that encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom
and not feel isolated, " 27 or "numbers such that underrepresented
minority students do not feel ... like spokespersons for their race." 28
The Court determined that the educational benefits produced by "critical
The Court believed the policy
mass" diversity were substantial."2
promoted "cross-racial understanding, help[ed] to break down racial
stereotypes and enable[d] [students] to better understand persons of
different races."' 30 The Court cited expert studies and reports introduced at trial that discussed the benefits of student body diversity
Promoting learning, preparing students for increased
including:
diversity in the workforce and society, and better preparing students as
professionals.' 3 ' The Court also cited amicus curiae briefs filed by
major American businesses and high-ranking retired officers and civilian
leaders of the United States military which detailed diversity's real
benefits.'3 2 It reasoned that law schools train a large number of the
nation's future leaders; therefore, access to a legal education must
include 33qualified individuals from every racial and ethnic background.1
Furthermore, the Court approved of the Law School's flexible use of
3
It determined that the Law School's
race in its admissions process.1'
goal of attaining a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students
did not create a quota system."' The Law School neither reserved a
fixed number of seats for minorities, nor insulated minorities from
comparison with the general admissions pool, which are both indicators
of quotas.' 3' The Law School's admissions process ensured that each
applicant was individually scrutinized.' 37 It gave serious consideration
to each applicant's possible contribution to a diverse learning environ-

126. Id. at 2333.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2333-34.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 2339.
Id. at 2339-40.
Id. at 2340.

132. Id. See Brief of Amicus Curiae 3M et al. at 4-5, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (no. 02241); Brief of Amicus Curiae General Motors Corp. at 3-4, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (no. 02241); Brief of Amicus Curiae Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 27, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (no.
02-241).
133. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
134. Id. at 2343-44.
135. Id. at 2342.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2343.
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ment."
The Court determined that the Law School's admissions
program was similar to the Harvard program endorsed by Justice Powell
in Bakke, which flexibly considered all diversity elements in equal
footing for each applicant.139 Moreover, like the Harvard program, the
Law School's race-based admissions program ensured all factors
contributing to diversity, including race, were considered in the
admissions decision."4 Non-minority applicants with grades and test
scores lower than underrepresented minorities were frequently admitted
to the Law School.'
This proved that the Law School gave weight to
non-racial diversity factors.'4 2 The Court determined that a narrowly
tailored admissions program does not "'unduly burden individuals who
are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups.'"'" Because
the Law School considered race among other diversity factors, and it was
not a quota system, the Court concluded it did not unduly harm nonminority applicants and was narrowly tailored."'
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In the twenty-five years since Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,'4 5 federal courts have struggled to interpret the fractured
Court's holding regarding race-based admissions programs in public
higher education. Some circuits adopted Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke and allowed race-based admissions programs, while others
declared these programs unconstitutional.'"
By following Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger47
ended the confusion and validated his conclusion that race-based
admissions programs are constitutional where the goal is student body
diversity.'"
Prior to the decision in Grutter,the most recent Supreme Court case
regarding diversity in higher education was the splintered decision in

138. Id.
139. Id. at 2343-44.
140. Id. at 2344.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2345 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
144. Id. at 2345-46.
145. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
146. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir.
2001); Smith v. Univ. of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000); Hopwood v. Texas, 236
F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
147. 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003).
148. Id. at 2347.
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Bakke. Federal courts had no concrete authority to follow when
reviewing race-based admissions programs resulting in different regions
following different laws based on what their circuit decided. The
decision in Grutter settles the question of whether race can be used as
a diversity factor and will help streamline admissions programs
nationwide. The Court provided a majority holding, unlike Bakke, that
race-based admissions programs are constitutional. 49 The Court also
provided guidelines on how to achieve a constitutional program. 50
Furthermore, the Court ended years of dissention by endorsing Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke. 5 ' The Court conclusively ended debate
about which opinion in Bakke constitutes the Court's holding. It is now
undisputed that race-based admissions programs seeking the achievement of student body diversity are constitutional.'5 2
In response to the Court's holding, public universities nationwide are
reviewing their admissions policies and either reinstating race-based
admissions programs, or aligning their current race-based admissions
programs with the Court's guidelines. 5 ' Public higher education
facilities must also align their public financial aid programs, recruiting,
outreach, and retention programs with the decision in Grutter because
race has been used as a factor in these areas.5 Public higher education institutions must now ensure that they articulate a legal justification for their race-based admissions programs.'55 An automatic point
distribution for minority applicants, like the policy in Gratz v. Bollinger, 5 ' is not an acceptable race-based admissions program.'5 7 Racebased admissions programs must contain holistic reviews for each
applicant, where race is not the only diversity factor, and all students
are in the same admissions pool.' The Court particularly emphasized
that each
institution must tie its race-based program to its educational
59
goals.

149. Id.
150. Id. at 2346.
151. Id. at 2337.
152. Id. at 2347.
153. Jonathan R. Alger, Assistant General Counsel, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, Diversity Issues and the Affirmative Action Debate after Grutter and Gratz, 1
(Sept. 13, 2003).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 4.
156. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
157. See supra note 153, at 1.
158. See supra note 153, at 5.
159. Memorandum from Ad Hoc Committee on Policy Issues, to Dean of Vanderbilt
University Law School 5 (Aug. 19, 2003) (on record with author).
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Race-based admissions programs are not yet safe from the Court's
scrutiny. Justice O'Connor opined that such programs will no longer be
necessary in twenty-five years.16 This expected termination is not a
concrete life expectancy. Twenty-five years have passed since the
opinion in Bakke, but the Supreme Court concluded that race-based
admissions programs are still necessary. 6 ' For the Court to expect
such programs to be unnecessary in twenty-five years is unrealistic
based on the current status of race in America. For such an expectation
to be fulfilled, the number of qualified minority applicants interested in
higher education must be increased.'62 This requires public higher
education institutions to work in conjunction with other institutions to
address educational preparedness for students in K-12 programs, and
examine other barriers in educational achievement." The decision in
Grutteris a step in the right direction because the Court recognized the
importance of diversity in higher education; however, it will take more
than a Supreme Court decision to repair the lack of diversity in public
higher education.
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